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ARTICLES
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: AMERICA'S
UNFULFILLED PROMISE*
CLYDE W.

I.

SUMMERS"*

THE PROMISE MADE

1797, WHEN ALBERT GALLATIN, LATER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
established a profit sharing plan in his glass works, he declared, "The
democratic principle on which this nation was founded should not be
restricted to the political process, but should be applied to the industrial
operation as well."' The theme that our system of political democracy should
be matched by a system of industrial democracy has been an irrepressible one
in our history.2 This theme is not ours alone, for in every political democracy
there is recognition that decisions of the work place may be more important to
the worker than decisions in the legislative halls.3 Democratic principles
demand that workers have a voice in the decisions that control their working
lives; human dignity requires that workers not be subject to oppressive
conditions or arbitrary actions. A review of the history of organized labor in
the United States illuminates the tenacity of this deeply rooted idea.
During the last half of the nineteenth century, efforts to achieve industrial
democracy took diverse forms. In the 1860's, William Sylvis of the Iron
Molders Union advocated worker ownership of factories and advanced
money to members for the establishment of foundries in several cities.
Workers purchased shares of stock, had the right to vote, selected
management, and determined major policies through group discussion. The
Knights of Labor sought to ultimately establish "cooperative institutions, such
as [would] supersede the wage system" and "eventually make every man his
own master - every man his own employer."4 This goal of direct worker
N

This article was the basis for the Fifteenth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar
Lecture delivered by Professor Summers on May 10, 1979, at the Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law of the Cleveland State University.
** Fordham Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.S., J.D., Univ. of Illinois;
J.S.D., Columbia Univ.; LL.D., Univ. of Louvain; LL.D., Univ. of Stockholm.
M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965, at 6 (1970).
2 The development of the idea of industrial democracy in its many variations has been admi-

rably charted by M. Derber. Id. Much of the historical discussion here has been drawn from
Derber's work and sources.
' See generally Industrial Democracy in InternationalPerspective, ANNALS, May 1977; F.
BASAGNI & F. SAUZEY, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND COMPANY REFORMs (1976); COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND COMPANY STRUCTURE, BULL. OF THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITES (Supp. Aug. 1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES]; F. GAMILLSCHEG, U.A., MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER (1978); INTERNATIONAL

INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES, BULL. No. 5 (1968); id., BULL.No.6 (1969); id., BULL. No.7 (1970);
id., BULL. No. 9 (1972); B. & S. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1965); W. WEDDERBURN ET AL.,
DEMOCRAZIA PoLrrIcA E DEMoCRAZIA INDUSrRIALE (1978).
' T. POWDERLY, THIRTY YEARS OF LABOR 1859-1889, at 464 (1890), cited in M. DERBER, supra
note 1, at 48.
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control was echoed by scholars and social reformers. In contrast a different
theme, professed by Edward Bellamy and other socialists, sought to achieve
democracy in industry by subjecting ownership and control of industry to the
political process.
These approaches were ultimately discarded, and the path chosen by the
American Federation of Labor was followed. Workers were to achieve a
voice by forming strong independent trade unions, the economic strength of
which would compel employers to listen. Participation through collective
bargaining was the method of determining terms and conditions of
employment with the employer; the rules governing the workplace were
those mutually agreed upon and expressed in the collective agreement.
The predominant response of employers to these demands for industrial
democracy was that the owners were endowed by law, if not by God, with
authority and responsibility to manage the business. Insistence by workers for
a voice in management decisions was a violation of property rights and the
moral order. A few progressive employers proposed profit sharing but
without any power sharing. Andrew Carnegie even declared the right of
workers to form unions to be "sacred" and advised against the use of
strikebreakers. Yet he stood by while workers were killed at his Homestead
plant and strikebreakers destroyed the union.
The courts reinforced the employers' view. Strikes and picketing were
declared invasions of property rights.5 The labor injunction was created and
refined to curb union action,6 and the legal rule that a worker could be
discharged without cause and without notice was judicially articulated. 7 The
employers' autocratic control was raised to a constitutional right when the
Supreme Court rebuffed Congress' attempt to outlaw "yellowdog" contracts 8
or regulate the maximum hours of work.9
Despite the opposition of employers and courts, the idea of industrial
democracy did not die. By the turn of the century, hope of achieving it
focused on unionization and collective bargaining. This view found its most
forceful expression in the Final Report of the Industrial Commission of 1902:10
By the organization of labor, and by no other means, it is possible to
introduce an element of democracy into the government of industry.
By this means only the workers can effectively take part in
determining the conditions under which they work. This becomes
true in the fullest and best sense only when employers frankly meet
the representatives of the workmen, and deal with them as parties
equally interested in the conduct of affairs.
• . . Only experience with democratic forms and methods can
develop the good that is in democracy; but so far as employers take a
5 Vegelahn v. Cuntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 832 (1926).
Note, Implied Contract Rights to lob Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 340-47 (1974).
8 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). A "yellow dog" contract is an employment
agreement which forbids employee membership or participation in a labor union or
organization.
I Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10XIX FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSlON, H.R. Doc. No. 380,57th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1902).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss1/5

2

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

1979]

long look ahead, and act in the interest of the ultimate welfare of
society, it is believed that they will encourage rather than repress the
growth of democratic government in their industries. .

.

. If they

adopt a repressive policy they may perhaps succeed in it; but so long
as the tradition of freedom is strong in the minds of the working
people they can not destroy the aspiration for a measure of selfgovernment in respect to the most important part of life. If the
working people are prevented from introducing an element of
democracy into industrial life by way of labor organization, they will
undertake to introduce it in another way.'
This declaration for industrial democracy was answered by the employers
with the "Open Shop" movement"2 and by the courts with paralyzing
decisions. Unions were found liable for treble damages for boycotting hats
made in non-union shops; 13 Samuel Gompers was found guilty of contempt
for publishing an "unfair" list; 14 and a federal court declared that unions were

illegal combinations violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 15 Woodrow
Wilson's "New Freedom" brought the Clayton Act with its ringing
declarations that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce" and that unions should not "be held or construed to be illegal
combinations . . . under the anti-trust laws."' Samuel Gompers hailed this

as "the Industrial Magna Carta,"'" apparently unaware that the feudal barons,
not the serfs, won at Runnymede. He soon discovered, however, that the
workers had acquired no new rights under the Clayton Act and that the courts
continued to protect the industrial barons.'8
The second major declaration for industrial democracy was by the
Commission on Industrial Relations, which in 1915 called for "the rapid
extension of the principles of democracy to industry."1 9 It stated that "[w]hat
each [wage earner] shall eat, what he shall wear, where he shall live, and bow
long and under what conditions he shall labor, are determined by his
industrial status and by relation individually or collectively to the person or
corporation employing him."20 "Political freedom," it declared, "can exist

only where there is industrial freedom; political democracy only where there
is industrial democracy." 2 ' The Commission emphasized that "the struggle of
11Id. at 805.
12 Perlman & Taft, Labor Movements, in 4 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932,
at 129-37 (1935).
13Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915); see also Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
14 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
'5 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 202 F. 512 (N.D. W. Va. 1912), rev'd, 214 F. 685 (4th
Cir. 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
16 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)).
'7 Gompers, The Charterof Industrial Freedom, Labor Provisions of the Clayton Antitrust
Law, 21 AM. FEDERATIONIST 957, 971 (1914).
"SSee Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing Co.
v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
19

U.S.

COMMISSION

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1

ON

INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS,

(1915) [hereinafter cited as

FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
FINAL REPORT

ON

(1915)].

20 Id. at 2-3.
21 Id. at 2.
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labor for organization is not merely an attempt to secure an increased measure
of the material comforts of life, but is a part of the age-long struggle for
liberty; . . . even if men were well fed they would still struggle to be free." 22
The Commission quoted at length the classic statement of Louis D.
Brandeis on the necessity for industrial democracy:
We must bear in mind all the time that however much we may desire
material improvement and must desire it for the comfort of the
individual, that we are a democracy; and that we must have, above
all things, men; and it is the development of manhood to which any
industrial and social system must be directed. .

.

. And therefore

the end toward which we must move is a recognition of industrial
democracy as the end to which we are to work ...
No mere liberality in the division of the proceeds of industry can
meet this situation. There must be a division not only of the profits,
but a division of responsibilities; and the men must have the
opportunity of deciding, in part, what shall be their condition and
how the business shall be run.23
Some employers experimented with various forms of employee
representation. Employers such as Filene; Hart, Schaffner & Marx; and the
Colorado Fuel & Iron Company initiated worker representation plans
without unions. 24 Some plans even adopted the title "Industrial
Democracy."2 5 With the coming of World War I, many other companies
adopted or had such plans thrust upon them by the National War Labor Board
or other government agencies.2 6 Although the National War Labor Board
adopted the principle of "the right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively through chosen representatives," it refused to allow unions to take
advantage of the war to force recognition. 27 Instead, the Board encouraged
the establishment of employee representation committees and insured
representation rights for non-union employees. Unions were recognized as
but one among many ways in which workers might find industrial democracy,
and by 1919 there were more than two hundred employee representation
plans covering a half million workers. 2 The unions did not protest the
creation of these representation committees but hoped to convert them into
25
union organizations at the end of the war.
22 Id.

at 80-81.

23 Testimony

of Louis D. Brandeis before the Commission on Industrial Relations. Id. at 81,
83-84 [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Louis D. Brandeis].
24 See E. BURTON, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION (1926); A. L. FIENE, A MERCHANT'S HORIZON
(1924); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, WORKS COUNCILS IN THE UNITED STATES,
RESEARCH REPORT No. 21 (1919) [hereinafter cited as NICB]; B. SELEKMAN & M. VON KLEECK,
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE COAL MINES (1924).
25 See, e.g., J. LEITCH, MAN TO MAN, A STORY OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1919). This plan was
patterned after the federal government, with a house elected by the workers, a senate elected by
foremen, and a cabinet made up of top executives.
26 E. BURTON, supra note 24, at 29; NICB, supra note 24, at 6-8.
27 W. LAUCK & C. WATTS, THE INDUSTRIAL CODE 56 (1922); W. STODDARD, THE SHOP CoMMrrrEE

13-14 (1920).
28 NICB, supra note 24.
29 M. DEBasE, supra note 1, at 213; Lescohier, Working Conditions,in 3 HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 346 (1935); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, LABOR
GoVEnRIENT 77 (1935).
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At the President's Industrial Conference in 1919, battle lines were drawn
as to which form industrial democracy should take. The American Federation
of Labor insisted that workers were entitled to select representative bodies,
even outside unions "of their own choosing." Employers, however, hoping to
forestall the emergence of powerful, independent union officials, sought to
limit the choice of representation to those within the ranks of their
employees. 3 The intractability of employers signalled three things: the
employers' rejection of collective bargaining with independent unions, their
intention to make employee representation plans captives of employer
control, and their intent to use the employee representation plans to defeat
unionization.
Through the 1920's employers embraced employee representation plans,
and by 1928 more than a million and a half workers were covered by such
plans. 31 The number diminished during the Depression years, but the passage
of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which gave employees the right to
organize, spurred a new drive creating company unions in order to forestall
organization by trade unions. Within six months the number of company
unions doubled,3 2 and by 1935 nearly two and a half million workers were in
33
such unions.
Although employers often created company unions in the name of
industrial democracy, company unions seldom gave the workers any effective
voice. Because they were confined to individual plants they had little
economic strength, and because they were economically dependent upon the
employer they had no financial resources. The workers elected had no
training or experience to be effective representatives. They had no one whom
they could call for help, and they were completely subservient to the
employer's control because they had no protection against retaliation for
speaking up.34 Instead of providing industrial democracy, company unions
35
provided an empty form which served to obstruct collective bargaining.
They had to be removed if real industrial democracy was to be achieved.
Finally, in 1935 the irrepressible plea for industrial democracy, given voice
by the Commission Reports of 1902 and 1915, became an affirmed promise by
the federal government. The National Labor Relations Act in its all-important
section 7 declared that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
30 The proceedings of the First Industrial Conference are described in National Industrial
Conference, Washington, D.C., 9 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1342 (1919). See also W. LAUCK & C.
WATrS, supra note 27, at 25-26, 108-11.
" NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BoARD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TI-mOUGH EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION 16 (1933).

32 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER

THE N.I.R.A. 24 (1933).
33TWENTIErH CENTURY FUND, supra note 29, at 79. For example, United States Steel, which
had previously refused to have any form of employee representation, began the movement
towards company unions in June, 1933. By the end of 1934, nearly one hundred formal
representation plans were in existence, covering 90-95% of all steelworks. I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS, 1933-1941, at 455 (1969).
31R. DUNN, COMPANY UMONS (1927); B. SELEKMAN & M. VON KLEE , supra 'note 24;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 29, at 65-113.
3' Lescohier, supra note 29, at 355-57.
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representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities,
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 6
The purposes of the National Labor Relations Act were many: to enable
workers to obtain a larger share of the products of industry, to reduce
industrial conflict, to increase mass purchasing power, to achieve more equal
distribution of income, and to resolve disputes over union recognition.
However, the primary purpose was to give employees an effective voice,
through collective bargaining, in determining the terms and conditions of
their employment. It echoed the historic declarations that political
democracy should be matched by industrial democracy. In the congressional
debates, Senator Wagner, author of the act, justified the principle that the
employer should be required to recognize and bargain with the majority
union in the following terms: "[D]emocracy in industry must be based on the
same principles as democracy in government. Majority rule, with all its
imperfections, is the best guaranty of worker's rights, just as it is the surest
guaranty of political liberty that mankind has yet discovered."17 In explaining
the undergirding philosophy of the statute, Senator Wagner stated:
The principles of my proposal were surprisingly simple. They were
founded upon the accepted facts that we must have democracy in
industry as well as in government; that democracy in industry means
fair participation by those who work in the decisions vitally affecting
their lives and livelihood; and that the workers in our great mass
production industries can enjoy this participation only if allowed to
organize and .bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing.38
The expectation and promise of the Wagner Act was to make possible for
all employees a system of industrial democracy. Collective bargaining would
become the established and accepted form of industrial relations. Through
collective bargaining employees would have an effective voice, would be able
to protect their own interests, and would achieve human dignity. They would
find freedom from the autocratic control of employers, and unilateral
dictation would be replaced by mutually accepted rules. The divine right of
employers would give way to democratic industrial government.
This was the promise of our national labor policy - industrial democracy
through collective bargaining.
II.

THE PROMISE PERFORMED

The promise of industrial democracy as a correlative of political
democracy has not been an empty one. Collective bargaining "through
representatives of their own choosing" has provided millions of workers an
effective voice in industrial government and has brought due process and
human dignity to their working lives.
Between 1935 and 1940, union membership nearly doubled, 9 and by 1974
38Cb.372, §7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (Wagner Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
79 CONC. R c. 7570 (1935).
38M. DEign,supra note 1, at 321 (citing N.Y. Times, April 13, 1937, at 20, col. 1).
39 In 1935, union membership in the United States was 3,609,300; in 1940 it was 7,055,000. L.
TROY, TRADE UNION MEMSERSHWI, 1897-1962, at 1 (1965).
3
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it was nearly six times that in 1935 when the national commitment was made. 40
It is estimated that at present nearly 25 million workers are covered by
collective agreements. 41 Coverage of production workers is almost complete42
in basic steel, automobile, aircraft, electrical machinery and transportation.
Collective agreements typically provide a comprehensive system of
benefits beyond wages and hours. These benefits include paid holidays and
vacations, sick leaves and personal leaves, clothing allowances, severance
pay, medical insurance, and pensions. With pregnancy leaves, bereavement
pay, and death benefits, they reach from before the cradle to after the grave.
Beyond these economic benefits collective agreements establish rules
which protect the individual from arbitrary treatment. Selection of
employees for transfers, promotions, or layoffs are governed by established
rules, not the unchecked preferences or whims of foremen or personnel
managers. Employees are protected against discharge by provisions which
require employers to prove just cause by clear and convincing evidence.
The collective agreement not only creates a system of rules governing the
workplace but also establishes in the grievance procedure an administrative
structure for interpreting, elaborating, and enforcing those rules. Arbitration
provides a judicial process for resolving disputes as to the application of the
agreement and the custom and practices which constitute the law of the shop.
The collective agreement, with its grievance procedure and arbitration, can
be fairly characterized as a constitution of industrial government, a
government bounded by a system of law and permeated with principles of
equality and procedural due process.
This industrial government is one in which the employees have an effective
voice. The union which represents them is selected by the majority of the
employees. Unions are typically constructed on the democratic model, with
officers elected by the members and policies decided by the members or their
elected representatives. In many unions, ratifying an agreement or calling a
strike requires approval by referendum, and processing grievances is subject
to direct membership control. Much of the decision-making of the union,
particularly in those matters of most immediate concern to individuals, is
exercised by the local union where there is the greatest opportunity for direct
participation.
The law, building on the principle of industrial democracy, requires
periodic election of union officers in open and fair elections and guarantees
basic democratic rights within the union, including the right to equal
participation; the right of free speech, free press, and free assembly in the
political processes of the union; the right to a fair hearing; the right to an
accounting of union funds; and a right that union officers serve the members as
43
trustees. Senator McClellan, in justifying the Landrum-Griffin Act,
explained:
40 Union membership, including employees' associations, was 22,600,000 in 1974. U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, DiRCroRY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES

(1975) [hereinafter cited as
41Id. at 79 n.2.
12 Id. at 70.

AssocIATIONS, BULL.No. 1937, at 57-58

DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS].

43Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,73 Stat. 519
(1959) (Landrum-Grifflin Act) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-531).
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[T]he justification and certainly the desirability for unionization is
the fact that the individual worker in an industrial economy has little
or no power, when he stands alone, to deal effectively with his
corporate employer. It is through unionization and bargaining
collectively that he is able to make himself heard at the bargaining
table. It seems clear, therefore, that this justification becomes
meaningless when the individual worker is just as helpless within his
union as he was within his industry, when the tyranny of the allpowerful corporate employer is replaced by the tyranny of the allpowerful labor boss.
• . .If unions are to have such federally bestowed, tremendous
powers in industrial government, they should be compelled by law
to represent their members in accordance with democratic
principles and to accord to them the basic rights of liberty, freedom,
44
and justice.
To be sure, not all unions are democratic. Some union leaders flaunt the
law and destroy democracy while promising it. They make the practice of
democratic forms a charade and manipulate procedures to preserve
entrenched bureaucracies. Nor has the law been fully effective in protecting
and encouraging union democracy. However, the unions of this country, at
least in comparative terms, are more democratic, more responsive to the
desires of their members, and
more sensitive to individual rights than the
4
unions in any other country.
Our collective bargaining process, despite its few repressive and renegade
unions, is in general a highly democratic system which allows for a large
measure of participation and assures protection of individual rights. Where
collective bargaining exists, it has provided a remarkably effective system of
industrial democracy. The promise, in that measure, has been largely fulfilled.

III. THE

PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Whence comes, then, my title, - "The Unfulfilled Promise"? The title
comes from the unpleasant fact that our success has caused us to overlook our
failures; our cup runneth over, but the well is dry. We have declared a national
labor policy of industrial democracy through collective bargaining, but we
have widely rejected it in practice. We have developed a remarkable system
of industrial democracy, but most workers do not enjoy it.
The vitality of collective bargaining in transportation and among
production workers in mass production industries causes us to forget that
seventy percent of employees in the private sector have no collective bargaining. 46 The automobile assembly lines are organized, but most of the white

J.

44105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959).
15 See generally A. CAEaw, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS (1976);
EDELSTEIN & M. WARNER, COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY (1975).
46 The exact percentage of employed workers covered by collective agreements is uncertain.

In 1974, the total labor force was 93.2 million, with 78.4 million non-agricultural employees and
3.5 million agricultural employees, or a total of 81.9 million employed workers. Collective
agreements of unions and employees' associations covered 24.7 million employees, or 30.1%of the
employed work force. See DIRECrORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS, supra note 40,at63, 79; U.S. DEP'T OF
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collar and professional employees of the auto companies have no representation. Men who drive trucks have a union to speak for them, but the waitresses in the restaurants where they eat have no spokesperson. The steelworker can challenge a mere reprimand through a grievance procedure, but
his garage mechanic can be discharged without notice or reason. Clerical
employees, bank employees, textile workers, agricultural laborers, and
workers in the service trades for the most part have no representation, no
voice, no rights, and no protection.
The promise of industrial democracy has not been fulfilled because collective bargaining has not become the accepted and established method of
conducting industrial relations. Instead, it is the exception, covering only
thirty percent of employed workers. Furthermore, it is not expanding. Over
the last twenty years the absolute number of union members has steadily
increased. Yet the percentage of workers who belong to unions has steadily
decreased so that it is only three-fourths what it was in 1954.47 The proportion
of workers covered by collective agreements has similarly declined. When
bargaining, the
one takes into account the expansion of public employee
48
decline in the private sector is even more marked.
This discussion leads to the questions: Why has the promise not been
fulfilled, and why has collective bargaining remained confined to such a
limited field? The primary reason, in my judgment, is because the overwhelming majority of employers has never accepted the basic premise of
industrial democracy, the premise that their employees have a right to an
voice in "what shall be their condition and how the business shall be
effective
run." ' 49 Rather than supporting and encouraging industrial democracy,
employers have vigorously resisted it.
When representation elections are held and the issue is whether there shall
be collective bargaining in the plant, the employer commonly campaigns
against collective bargaining. He distributes literature in the plant urging
employees to vote "No Union" while prohibiting union organizers from
entering the plant to distribute union literature. Foremen talk against the
union during working hours, while, at the same time, employees are
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS,

1977, BULL. No. 1966, at 21,

293.
47

Year

Union Membership
(thousands)
17,022
16,802
17,049
17,299
19,381
19,564
20,238

Non-Agricultural Employees
(thousands)
49,022
50,675
54,234
60,815
70,593
76,945
85,763

Percent
Union Members
34.7
33.2
31.4
28.4
27.5
25.4
23.6

1954
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1978
Sources: U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1975,
BULL. No. 1865, at 389 (for years 1954 through 1970); GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA), No. 827, at 35
(Sept. 10, 1979) (for years 1975 and 1978).
" Between 1968 and 1978, public sector union membership increased by 1,472,000, while
private sector unions grew by only 54,000 members. Between 1976 and 1978, union membership
in the public sector increased by 613,000 while private sector unions actually decreased by 8,000.
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA), No. 827, at 34 (Sept. 10, 1979).
9 Testimony of Louis D. Brandeis, supra note 23, at 84.
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prohibited from soliciting union support. The employer conscripts
employees in a captive audience to listen to reasons why they should vote
against the union but denies the union equal time to argue for collective
bargaining. Throughout his campaign the employer characterizes a vote in

favor of collective bargaining as a vote against the employer.50
The fact that these anti-collective bargaining activities are legal does not
make them any less a rejection of industrial democracy. Freedom of speech,
in our constitutional system, is guaranteed equally to those who believe in

democracy and those who would deny or disable it.
However, not all employers stay within the limits of the law. Substantial

numbers of employers willingly violate the law; they prefer to risk legal
sanctions rather than to accept industrial democracy. Employees are
prohibited from even discussing unionization in the plant; union sympathizers

are reprimanded, demoted, or discharged; and employees are told that if they
vote for collective bargaining, benefits will be taken away or the plant will be
closed. If, in spite of this, the union wins, then the employer refuses to meet
and negotiate.5 In one year, more than 27,000 unfair labor practice charges
were filed with the National Labor Relations Board against employers. Back
pay of more than $13 million was ordered to 8,000 workers, and 5,500 workers
were ordered reinstated.52 Orders of the Natonal Labor Relations Board and
court decisions are appealled or even defied until the employees are
discouraged and the union has disintegrated.
The unending resistance of J. P. Stevens and Co., with its history of
repeated violations, is notorious; 53 unfortunately it is not an isolated case but a
50 These tactics are illustrated by numerous concrete examples in OversightHearingson the
NLRA: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations of the House Comm. on
Educationand Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings].
There are consulting firms whose primary business is to advise employers how to prevent
unionization or defeat unions in an election. These firms have developed comprehensive antiunion programs and sophisticated techniques. One such firm participates in thirty to thirty-five
anti-union campaigns a month with charges ranging to $250,000 and more. Hauser, The Union
Busting Hustle, NEW REPuBLic, Aug. 25, 1979, at 16.
The Practising Law Institute has published and distributed a work entitled L. JACKSON & R.
LEwis, WINNINc NLRB ELECTIONS: MANAsrEMENT'S STRATEGY AND PREVENTATIVE PROGRAMS (1972).
The book's stated purpose is to explain to lawyers and their client employers "how the client may
best reach his objective of remaining unorganized." Id. at 1.A representation election is described
as "a contest for the allegiance of employees," and the employer is told that he should "take pride"
in his employees not being represented by a union, for it evidences that "he is an enlightened
employer" who "attends to his employees' needs." Id. at 2. See also W. KRUPMAN, BASIC LAIOR
RELATIONS (1974), which addresses the same audience and says, "[w]e have found the most
effective campaign is one that gets the employees to vote against the union rather than for the
employer." Id. at 31.
51See Oversight Hearings, supra note 50, for a full range of examples of deliberate and
repeated violations of the law to defeat unionization.
5243 NLRB ANN. REP. 8-12 (1978).
53 For a brief sketch of J. P. Stevens' repeated violations of the law, see NLRB v. J. P. Stevens
& Co., 563 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). This was the second contempt proceeding, denominated by the
court "Stevens XVIII in the long list of Stevens litigation." Id. at 25. Since that contempt order the
company has twice been found guilty of multiple unfair labor practices. 240 N.L.R.B. No. 35
(1979); 239 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1978). At a 1976 stockholders meeting, J. P. Stevens officials declared
that the cost of fighting the union over a period of fifteen years, including payment to employees
for back pay of over $1.3 million, was not significant. Oversight Hearings,supra note 50, at 193.
An increase in wages of 14 per hour would, in the same period, have cost $12 million. See also
Kovach, J. P. Stevens and the Struggle for Union Organization,29 LAB. L.J. 300 (1978).
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dramatic example of all too common practices. 54 It is not surprising, in the

face of this employer opposition, that unions win less than half of the
representation elections held by the Board. 55
The refusal of employers to accept collective bargaining as a form of
industrial democracy was vividly illustrated in 1978 by the defeat of the Labor
Reform Bill. 56 Without entering into a debate on the details of that legislation
as it came before the Senate, the bill could be fairly characterized as doing
nothing more than making organization and the winning of elections

marginally easier for unions and making more effective sanctions available
against employers who violate the National Labor Relations Act. 57 It would
have slightly reduced the ability of employers to defeat collective bargaining
by lawful means and would have increased the costs of employers'
obstruction by unlawful means. It would have had no impact on employers

who favored collective bargaining or who wished to remain neutral.
Nevertheless, employers presented a solid phalanx of opposition, even to the
point of supporting a filibuster in the Senate to block the majority will. The

opposition included the National Chamber of Commerce, 58 the National
Association of Manufacturers, 59 the National Small Business Association, 0 the
62
6
American Trucking Association, ' the Aerospace Industries Associations,
63
and the American Hospital Association.

Of critical importance is the fact that this opposition was supported by
employers who had engaged in collective bargaining for thirty or forty years.

The law would not have touched their established bargaining relationships;
-4 Among the other chronic offenders, or "rogue employers," are Litton Industries, see
Oversight Hearings,supra note 50, at 125-48; Dow Chemical Corporation, id. at 337-454; and
Monroe Auto Equipment Company, id. at 76-124.
51See 43 NLRB ANN. REP. 14 (1978).
51124 CONG. REc. S9410-12 (daily ed. June 22,1978). See generally LaborReform Act of 1977,

Hearingson H.R. 8410 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations of the Comm. on
Educationand Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Hearingson S. 1883 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as

Labor Reform Act of 1977, Hearings].
-7 124 CONG. REc. S8814 (daily ed. June 8,1978). The Senate Committee on Human Resources
reported a bill, S. 2467, for Senate consideration. S. REP. No. 95-628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
This bill, however, was never debated by the Senate but was replaced by a substitute bill. Various
provisions were designed to speed the processes of the NLRB by increasing the number of board
members to seven, providing for summary judgment proceedings in routine cases, and setting
mandatory election deadlines. The most hotly debated provisions of the substitute bill were as
follows: those which would have given unions a narrowly limited right to reply when an employer
made a captive audience speech; those which would have provided a possible, though closely
restricted, "make whole" remedy when an employer persisted in refusing to bargain with the
union; those which would have permitted debarment from government contracts of employers
who wilfully violated Board or court orders (but such debarment would have been limited to
facilities where the violations occurred and would be lifted as soon as there was compliance with
the order); and those which would have permitted the Board to assess back 'Payliability of one
and one half times the loss of earnings suffered where the discriminatory discharge occurred
during the period the employees were seeking union representation and during the period the
union was seeking its first contract.

51Labor Reform Act of 1977, Hearings, supra note 56, at 524.
59Id.
60 Id.
61Id.
62 Id.
63Id.

at
at
at
at
at

144.
502.
243.
737.
764.
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instead it would have increased the likelihood that others, including their
competitors, would be forced to accept collective bargaining. They could, of
course, have believed that the bill was not an effective or appropriate way of
achieving its declared goals, but they made no alternative proposals for
encouraging or extending collective bargaining, nor even any proposals for
strengthening the enforcement of employer unfair labor practices. No
employer was willing to declare itself in favor of industrial democracy
through collective bargaining. All committed their political weight to prevent
its extension.6 4 The message is clear and unmistakable. Employers have not
accepted industrial democracy. Their hope is not for its fulfillment but its
containment, if not its ultimate demise.
The limited success of collective bargaining, however, cannot be
attributed entirely to employer opposition. There seems to be a deep-rooted
reluctance among a substantial number of workers to join unions or to vote for
union representation. This reluctance is particularly pronounced among
certain categories of white collar and professional employees, and it seems to
be present among workers in rural areas and in certain sections of the country.
The roots of this reluctance are difficult to trace, but they grow, in major
part, out of certain perceptions which many workers have of unions. In some
circumstances, unions are perceived as ineffective in providing economic
benefits, a useful voice, or substantial protection. The risk of strikes and the
cost of dues is not seen as being worth what the union provides. In other cases,
union leaders are perceived as bureaucratically indifferent, intolerant of
dissent, dictatorial or dishonest, and more interested in institutional or
personal promotion than in industrial democracy or the workers' welfare.
These perceptions - or misperceptions - are cultivated and encouraged by
employer anti-unionism and the community climate which that anti-unionism
creates. Some union leaders seem determined to cooperate in confirming this
image and, by their conduct, to etch it more deeply in the public mind. These
perceptions are largely the product of minor defaults which are magnified by
the mass media. However mistaken these defaults may be, they are
nevertheless real. Apart from these misperceptions, many workers are
reluctant to join or support unions because of the unions' support of particular
political programs and candidates. Many workers do not want to intermingle
representation at the workplace with representation in the political forum.
The fact that so many workers seem reluctant to join unions and willing to
vote "No Union" in representation elections does not necessarily show
disinterest in industrial democracy or satisfaction with being subject to the
employer's unilateral control. In a number of cases employees have voted to
reject the union and then sought to establish some other form of
representation. With few exceptions the National Labor Relations Board has
found such representation structures to be unlawful employer-dominated
unions, 65 even though they were the free choice of the employees. 66 Because
4 See id.
76
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)(19 ) prohibits employer dominated unions.
"I See generally Sangerman, Employee Committees: Can They Survive under the TaftHartley Act?, 24 LAB. L.J. 684 (1973); Note, Does Employer Implementation of Employee
Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the NRLA?, 49 IM. L.J. 516 (1974); Note, New
6
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historically employee representation schemes were shams to forestall
unionization and give employees no real voice,6 7 the legal rules created under

the National Labor Relations Act require employees to choose either
representation by a union which bargains at arms length on an adversarial

basis with the employer or no representation at all. Intermediate devices of
employee-management committees or other alternatives are frowned upon.

The only permissible form of industrial democracy is collective bargaining
conceived as an adversarial collective bargaining process. Employees are
forced to a choice, not between industrial democracy and no industrial
democracy, but between unions and no industrial democracy.
Even where collective bargaining exists, the promise of industrial
democracy has only been partially fulfilled, for neither the law nor the
practice has accepted employees as full partners in the enterprise. The legal
scope of mandatory bargaining - shared decision-making, if you will - does
not extend to many decisions which vitally affect the workers. In Fibreboard
v. NLRB, 6 Justice Stewart characterized the statutory words defining the
duty to bargain as "words of limitation." 69 He declared that many decisions
which imperil or destroy the job security of employees are solely for
management. Decisions to continue subcontracting, 70 to close one of several
plants, 71 to build a new plant, 72 to liquidate assets, 73 to sell a part or all of the
enterprise,7 or to become part of a conglomerate 75 are all decisions which
may be more important to the employees than wages or hours of work.

Nevertheless, the courts have held that the employees have no right to be
notified, no right to discuss, and no right to use their concerted efforts to affect
these types of decisions. 76 The impact on the employees' livelihoods and their
futures may be far greater than the impact on the stockholders or management, but the employees have no voice. They do not even have a right to know
the business facts on which the decision was based; they are told only of the
consequences which they must bear because of a unilateral management
decision.
Employers are not prohibited from sharing such decision-making with
Standardsfor DominationandSupport under Section 8(a)(2), 82YATu L.J.510 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as New Standards]. The courts have not all been as rigid as the NLRB in outlawing
employee representation structures. Compare NLRB v. Tappan Stove Co., 174 F.2d 1007 (6th
Cir. 1949) (employer's participation in union reorganization influenced independent employee
association) with Hertzka v. Knowles, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875
(1975) (employer participation in in-house committee not interference).
17 See Lescohier, supra note 29; TwEN mE
CENTURY FUND, supra note 29.
68 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
69 Id. at 220 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
71 Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. Brockway Motor Trucks
v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978) (plant closing held not to be a mandatory subject of
bargaining).
72 American Can Co. v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
71United Auto Workers v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
15 I.A.M. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
76 See generally R. SwiFr, NLRB AND MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING (1974); Rabin,
Fibreboard and the Terminationof Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for Standardsin Defining
the Scope of the Duty to Bargain,71 COLUM. L. REV. 803 (1971).
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their employees, and there are examples where employers either have sought
the aid or advice of the union in such decisions or have consulted fully with
the union so that the employees' interests are fully considered. Few employers
go beyond the requirements of the law; indeed, most attempt to narrow the
area of joint decision-making by broad management rights clauses in their
collective agreements. The dominant attitude of employers, it is fair to say, is
that sharing decision-making with the representative of their employees
amounts to surrendering control of the enterprise to an alien force. Their
attitude toward the union is not unlike that of James I toward Parliament; the
divine right of employers leaves little room for industrial democracy.
Our proclaimed national policy of collective bargaining has not only failed
to provide seventy percent of employees any effective voice in industrial government, it has caused us to neglect their need for protection against oppressive conditions and arbitrary treatment which denies their human dignity.
Those not covered by collective agreements get little effective protection
from the law. They are covered by minimum wage laws, but a minimum
77
wage will not provide the worker's family subsistence, much less decency.
They are covered by maximum hour laws, but those laws provide only extra
pay for overtime and do not limit the number of hours they can be required to
work. They are nominally protected by health and safety legislation, but
inspections are rare, enforcement officers few, and remedies largely ineffective. 78 Many have no paid vacations, paid holidays, or paid sick leave. They
can be subject to favoritism, abusive treatment, and arbitrariness by their
supervisors with no reliable method of redress. Finally, they are made wholly
subservient by the employer's nearly absolute right to discharge without
79
reason and without notice.
The bitter irony is that this failure to protect the human dignity of
individual workers is at least in part because of the promise of industrial
democracy. Workers were to obtain these benefits for themselves through
collective bargaining, and industrial self-government was to make legal
protection unnecessary. Where collective bargaining exists, it does perform
this function quite fully, and this dulls our sense of need to provide these
protections by law. The very success of unions in protecting those covered by
collective agreements has deadened their demands for general legislation.
Indeed, unions have at times opposed legislation which would give to every
employee the benefits which unions have achieved by collective bargaining.
It is painfully clear that despite the promise of industrial democracy,
incorporated in the Wagner Act in 1935, seventy percent of employees have
no industrial democracy. They have no participation in industrial government
through collective bargaining, and they do not have protection against
oppressive conditions or arbitrary treatment which denies their human dignity. This is the measure of our failure; this is the unfulfilled promise.
77The Social Security Administration's poverty line for a city family of four in 1975 was an
annual income after taxes of $5,500. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE
MEASURE OF PovERTy 9 (1976). At that time the minimum wage was $2.10 an hour. A person fully
employed on a forty hour week would provide an annual income before taxes of $4,368.
7' See N. AsHFoRD, CIsis IN THE WORKPLuACE: OCCUwATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY (1976).
71Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, Individual ProtectionagainstUnjust Dismissal:Time ora Statute, 62 VA.
L. REv. 481 (1976).
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IV.

PossBiLrrEs FoR FULFILLMENT

We now must face the question of what might be done to achieve a greater
measure of industrial democracy. The starting point is a recommitment to that
goal. The following statement, made in 1915 by the Industrial Relations
Committee, is as true today as it was in 1915: "Political freedom can exist only
where there is industrial freedom; political democracy where there is
industrial democracy."80 But our emphasis on efficiency of production, our
dispute over division of shares, and our concern with industrial conflict have
caused us largely to forget the more fundamental values of democracy and
human dignity. These are the values which must again become central in
developing our national labor policy. The words of Brandeis must again
become our guide: "[I]t is the development of manhood to which any
industrial and social system must be directed. .

.

. And therefore the end to

which we must move is a recognition of industrial democracy as the end to
which we are to work ..

."

There are at least three paths along which we might move toward that end,
paths which are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. First, we
can take steps to extend industrial democracy by extending collective
bargaining. Second, we can devise other forms of industrial democracy
where collective bargaining has not become established. Third, we can
provide legal protection for basic rights of individual workers. I can only
sketch out here what might be done along each of these paths.
The first path, extending industrial democracy through collective
bargaining, already has the rudimentary steps quite clearly marked. Unions
should have the fullest opportunity to communicate with workers and
persuade them of the advantages of collective bargaining. They should have
access to the employees in the natural forum for discussion of that subject the workplace. The legal rule that union organizers seeking to contact
employees can be barred from the parking lot or plant is an unjustified
obstacle on the path toward industrial democracy. Employer prohibitions
against employees soliciting union support or distributing literature on nonworking time should be allowed only in the most compelling circumstances.
If the employer uses the workplace or work time to present arguments against
industrial democracy, then the union should have at least equal access and
time to present the arguments for industrial democracy. 82
Many of the existing legal rules concerning organizational campaigns and
much of the discussion of legislation in this area are permeated with the
assumption that the law should remain neutral in the debate whether the
employees should choose collective bargaining. In the name of "neutrality,"
the employer is allowed to invoke legal claims of "property rights" to limit
speech on behalf of collective bargaining while he exploits his position to
speak against it. 3 To be sure, the employer has the right of free speech to
10FINAL

REPORT (1915), supra note 19, at 2.

81Testimony of Louis D. Brandeis, supra note 23, at 83.
812For a discussion of the development of the law and the changes needed to protect free
speech and to provide equal access, see Note, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free
Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1979).
83 See, e.g., Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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oppose collective bargaining, and the employees have the right to choose
whether to accept or reject collective bargaining. However, a society which
seeks both political and industrial democracy cannot be indifferent to the
outcome. Certainly, it need not give a legal advantage to those who work to
defeat those goals.
The second and most crucial step toward our goal is providing more
effective remedies for violation of employees' rights. 84 Significantly expediting the administrative process is probably impossible, but protecting
employees' rights from continuing violations in the interim is possible.
Temporary injunctions against employer violation of employee rights should
be at least as available as injunctions against union violations of employer
rights. s5 Certainly, the Board should have the injunctive power of the courts
immediately available to protect the process of electing representatives.
Discharged employees should be ordered reinstated pending Board
proceedings unless the employer can show by clear and convincing evidence
that the discharge was for just cause.86 When the employer has been found
guilty of a statutory violation, there should be available in appropriate
instances punitive remedies sufficient to discourage employers from repeated
violations. The rights being violated are individual rights of the employees
and encompass the right to industrial democracy. The employers' violations
are not only violations of basic rights of citizenship but offenses against the
democratic process itself. The remedies should be appropriate to the rights
violated.
The third step in making collective bargaining a more effective instrument
of industrial democracy is to extend the area of employee participation in the
decisions of the enterprise. In principle, employees should have a right to be
fully informed and to have a voice in all matters which affect their welfare; this
goes far beyond the prices charged for food in the vending machine.8 7 The
employees have a vital stake in the financial health of the enterprise, its
building of new plants and closing of old ones, its changes in products or
production methods, and its merger with or sale to other companies. For the
law to assert that they have no interest is to depart from reality.
Business needs for secrecy may be sufficiently compelling at times to affect
the time when the employees can be informed or consulted; however, the
'4 See D. McDowELL & K. HullS, NLRB REMEDIES

FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (1976);

Note,

Employer Pre-electionCoercion:A Suggested Approach for Effective Remedial Action, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 1115 (1967).
85 The National Labor Relations Act section 10 (1), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1) (1976), mandates that
the regional office of the National Labor Relations Board seek interim injunctions for union
violations of sections 8(b)(4), 8(b)(7), and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
158(b)(4), 158(b)(7), and 158(e)(1976). There is no such mandate for any employer violations.
Indeed, the courts generally have been reluctant to grant injunctions except where the employer's
violations were so flagrant as to be almost without doubt.
8 The hardship of an employee being out of work while the case is pending is severe; any
remedy often comes too late to repair his monetary loss and fails to repair the damage to him
personally and to his family. The hardship on an employer to keep on an employee for whom he
cannot prove just cause for discharge is not severe; it is the burden which all employers accept
when they sign collective agreements with just-cause discharge clauses. Giving priority to the
employer's interest in dismissing unliked employees is an echo of the anachronistic assumption
that the employee has no interest in continued employment entitled to legal protection.
87 Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
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need for secrecy is much less than is commonly claimed, and employee
representatives can be legally bound to confidentiality. Some matters in
which employees have a vital interest may not be appropriate for resolution
by economic force or for inclusion in a collective agreement, but that should
not bar employees from having some voice in those matters. 88 Democratic
principles dictate that the employees have at least the right to know the facts,
the right to discuss the issues, and the right to assert their conclusions on all
these matters.
The second path toward increasing industrial democracy, that of devising
new forms of worker participation, requires more imagination and more care.
It requires creating new structures in those areas where collective bargaining
does not exist and where, even with additional legal protection, it will not exist
in the near future. Those new structures ought not to obstruct the extension of
collective bargaining where and when it may come, but they should be
available to serve in the interim, or as a second best. I sketch here three
tentative possibilities, all of them no doubt provocative.
One step would be to allow employees, where there is no majority in favor
of union representation, to create whatever structure of representation they
might choose. The structure might include supervisory personnel and joint
committees of employees and management. Its physical facilities and costs of
operation could be paid by the employer. The only limitations would be that
it be chosen by the employees and not imposed by the employer, that the
employees be free at any time to amend or abolish the structure, and that any
individual would be free not to participate. Such a structure should not be
allowed to appear on the ballot in a Board election or be the exclusive
representative of the employees unless it met the standards of a fully
independent labor organization. Nor would any agreement negotiated by it
be a bar to an election or limit any employee's right to strike or to be
represented by a union.8 9 However, its existence, and the employer's dealing
with it, would not be an unfair labor practice.
Such a structure would, of course, be less than fully satisfactory in giving
effective representation. It would lack full independence, be weak in
bargaining, and unable to endure extended economic conflict. It would, of
course, be no substitute for a union, but it is not intended to be. It is only a substitute for no representation at all and is grounded on the proposition that employees ought not be deprived of this alternative where they so choose. Such
forms of representation may, in some cases, dull the appeal of unions, but
18 NLRB and court decisions have created categories of "mandatory" and "permissive"
subjects of bargaining. If a subject is "mandatory," the employer must bargain with the union on
request, the employer cannot take unilateral action without first bargaining to impasse, and the
union may use economic force to achieve its demands. If a subject is "permissive," none of these
legal consequences apply. Common sense and practical considerations would suggest that
separate categories be defined for each legal consequence. Particularly, the employer's duty to
provide information and to discuss "mandatory" subjects on request might extend to a much
broader range of subjects than the employer's duty not to act without first bargaining to impasse
or the union's right to strike. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
81 For a similar proposal, see New Standards,supra note 66; for a proposal which would go
substantially further, allowing a joint employee committee to compete on an equal footing with a
fully independent union, see Jackson, An Alternative to Unionization and the Wholly
Unorganized Shop: A Legal Basis for Sanctioning JointEmployer-Employee Committees and
Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 809 (1977).
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it should be remembered that in the steel industry and other places, employee
representation plans provided the framework for union organization.9"
Another step, much more limited, would be to establish statutory safety
committees. The Occupational Safety and Health Act 9' provides a wide range
of participation rights to an "organization of employees" or "representative of
employees" in the enforcement of the statute. This participation includes
filing requests for standards, 92 initiating inspections, 93 accompanying the
inspector on his tour, 94 challenging the abatement period 95 and bringing
mandamus to compel the Secretary to enjoin imminent dangers. 96 The
purpose of these provisions is to give employees an active voice in safety and
health matters and to police compliance with the statute at the workplace.
Where employees are represented by a union, the effectiveness of the statute is
significantly reinforced. Yet in the majority of workplaces the employees have
no representative. Enforcement of the statute requires active and continuous
participation by the employees, not as individuals but as a group acting
through chosen representatives.
To achieve the purposes of the statute, provision could be made for the
establishment of safety committees in workplaces where there was no union
representative. These safety committees could be elected by the employees
to act as their representative under the statute. The election of such a
committee could be called for by any employee in accordance with
regulations of the Secretary of Labor. Members of the committee would be
entitled to reasonable time off from work, with pay, to make inspections,
process complaints, and carry on other necessary work of the committee. The
employer would be required to provide any necessary office or administrative
costs and would be required to pay for training courses to enable the
committee members to perform their function.97 The costs of the safety
committee, including the training of its members, should be considered one of
the costs of production, the same as safety equipment, accident prevention
programs, and workmen's compensation. It should be emphasized that
statutory safety committees would be created only where there was no union
representative, for the purpose is to provide representation where none other
exists.
Safety and health is but one condition of employment requiring employee
10See I.

BE isTEiN, supra note 33, at

455-68.

91 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
92 Section 6(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)(1976).
93Section 8(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. 657(f)(1)(1976).
14 Section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 657(e)(1976).
15Section 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(e)(1976).
91Section 13(d), 29 U.S.C. § 662(d)(1976).
'r The establishment of employee elected safety committees is required either by statute or by
confederal agreements in almost every western european country. For example, in Belgium and
France, worker safety committees are mandated by statute; in Sweden they were originally
established by national agreements between the union and employer confederations but are now
required by legislation; while in Western Germany the statutorily created works councils are
given special authority and responsibility in safety matters. See generally Smitis, Workers'
Participationin the Enterprise-TranscendingCompany Law, 38 MOD. L. REv. (1975); Note,
Employee Codetermination:Originsin Germany, Present Practicein Europe, and Applicability
to the United States, 14 HAv. J. Lczis. 947 (1977).
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participation. Industrial democracy requires workplace participation in all
conditions of employment. Where the union is the majority representative,
this function is performed by the union, its shop stewards, and its plant
committees. But where there is no majority union, the employees have no
representation at the workplace. They have no one to speak for them, no
protection, and no procedure. This includes seventy percent of the employed
work force. This country almost stands alone among democratic countries in
leaving the majority of its workers without any representation at the workplace. Other countries have established by law works councils or similar
structures to provide such representation. 8
As a third step to achieving industrial democracy, we could provide by
law for the establishment of works councils elected by the employees with
certain prescribed functions and authority. There is no need to work out the
details here; it is enough to say that there is a variety of working models in
other countries to provide guides for working out a solution adapted to our
own collective bargaining process. Again, such works councils would be
statutorily required only where there was no majority union. When a union
obtained a majority, it would incorporate or supplant the works council.
Unions, of course, look with suspicion on any form of representation other
than through the union, and they understandably view any purely internal
structure as employer dominated. The alternative, however, is to leave
employees without any representation. The dangers of employer domination
are largely eliminated where the structure is statutorily created and defined
and the employer is required by law to provide administrative and financial
support. The employee organization would not be dependent on the
employer for existence or support but would have legal rights against the
employer to secure its operation. The establishment of works councils would
give employees experience in representation, articulate the social policy that
employees should have a voice, and lead employees to have increased
expectations of industrial democracy. The works councils could provide the
training ground and the building blocks for union organizations. To the extent
that the works councils failed to provide effective representation, the union's
ability to capture or supplant them would be increased.
We can move toward increased industrial democracy by extending
collective bargaining, but that will not likely carry us to the goal. We can move
further by developing other forms of participation for areas where collective
bargaining does not reach. Yet there will still be need for guaranteeing the
basic rights of all individuals to humane conditions of employment and
protection against arbitrary treatment. This is the third path we should
explore.
The most fundamental individual right needing protection, apart from the
right to a healthy and safe workplace, is the right not to be discharged except
for just cause. This basic right is recognized and protected by almost every
collective agreement; unions insist on it as non-negotiable, and employers
accept it as inevitable. Yet, seventy percent of employees have no such pro9 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 3; I.L.O., Worker Participation

in Decisions within Undertakings, Labour Management Relations Series, No. 948 (1976); A.
STURMTHAL, WORKERS COUNCIlS (1964).
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tection but are subject to the anachronistic common law rule that an employer
can arbitrarily discharge an employee with no reason and without notice.
Practically every other democratic country provides legal protection against
arbitrary discharge; the United States stands in unenlightened isolation.
It is time and past time that we legally prohibited discharge without just
cause, giving all employees substantially the same protection enjoyed by
those covered by collective agreements. We are more able now to undertake
this legal protection than other countries were when they enacted their
statutes, for we have developed standards and procedures through our
experience with arbitration under collective agreements which can provide
guides for statutory protection. I will not try to describe here the details, for
that has been done elsewhere. It is enough to say that the means are readily at
hand.
The right not to be discharged without just cause is not only fundamental
in itself, but protection of this right would give employees increased
protection in their exercise of other rights essential to industrial democracy.
An employee discharged for union activities would not need to prove the
employer's motive; the burden would be on the employer to prove just cause.
An employee would be less afraid to report safety violations because the
employer could not use a spurious excuse to discharge him. An officer in an
employee representation plan would not be so subservient to the employer,
for he would have a statutory shield against dismissal. Protection against
unjust discharge is basic for the human dignity of the individual worker, for it
gives him some escape from subservience to the employer, allows him to
speak his mind, enables him to demand his rights, and encourages him to
assert himself as a person. It is a crucial first step toward the promised goal of
industrial democracy.
The law could directly protect individual employees in other basic rights.
For example, workers' health and safety could be given increased protection
by not limiting their recovery for industrial disease and injury to workmen's
compensation, where the disease or injury is the result of employer violation
of health and safety regulations. Employers should be required to pay at least
the actual loss caused by their violation of this basic right of employees to
physical integrity. Employees' rights to reasonable hours of work could be
protected by positively prohibiting an employer from requiring an employee
to work more than a certain number of hours a week. The present penalty pay
of time-and-a-half is not always enough to discourage oppressive work
schedules. Workers' rights to rest and relaxation could be guaranteed with
legally required paid vacations, and payment for legal holidays could be
required so that no worker would be penalized on a holiday week with a
reduced pay check. These examples are only suggestive of workers' rights
which could be legally protected if we committed ourselves to guaranteeing
all workers humane conditions of employment.
It should be emphasized that most of these rights are already recognized
by collective agreements. Unions have insisted upon them as fundamental,
and employers have accepted them as appropriate and feasible.
Nevertheless, for those workers not covered by collective agreements, these
rights are not guaranteed. The proposal is not to supplant collective
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss1/5
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bargaining, but to guarantee a minimum level of basic rights where
bargaining does not exist. Such legislation will not render unions or collective
bargaining unnecessary, for unions will bargain for more than the legal
minimum just as they now do on wages, safety measures, unemployment
insurance and pensions.
V.

SUMMARY

The demand for industrial democracy, as a complement to political
democracy, has been a persistent one since the beginning of our Republic.
After more than a half century of industrial conflict in which workers sought
"to introduce an element of democracy into the government of industry," 99
and struggled not only to be well fed but to be free, the promise of industrial
democracy was articulated in the Wagner Act of 1935. 100 There was to be "fair
participation by those who work in the decisions vitally affecting their lives
and livelihood," and that participation was to be achieved by collective
°
bargaining through "representatives of their own choosing."''
The assumption of the Wagner Act was that collective bargaining would
become the accepted and established method of decision-making in all
branches of industry and commerce. That assumption has not been realized.
After nearly half a century of organizing efforts, less than one-third of the
workers are covered by collective agreements; more than two-thirds still have
no participation in the decisions which vitally affect their working lives. In that
large measure, the promise of industrial democracy remains unfulfilled.
If we continue to believe, as did Brandeis, that "the end toward which we
must move is a recognition of industrial democracy," and that "[t]here must
be a division not only of profits, but a division of responsibilities,"' 0 2 we must
find ways to fulfill the promise. One avenue is to foster and encourage the
extension of collective bargaining by law. For the law should not be neutral or
indifferent to achieving the goal of industrial democracy. This avenue alone,
however, is not enough. Experience suggests that collective bargaining will
not, at least in the foreseeable future, become universal. We must, therefore,
devise new forms of worker participation and worker protection which will
be applicable where collective bargaining does not exist.
We have relied so completely on collective bargaining that we have given
almost no thought to other ways of moving toward the goal of industrial
democracy. Indeed, there is almost an instinctive reaction to any suggestions
of alternatives. We must now face the unwelcome fact that collective
bargaining is incomplete, and we must fill the places it has not reached. This
article has presented not so much proposals to be adopted, but possibilities to
be explored. The purpose here is not to reach conclusions, but to urge a
beginning.

11See text

accompanying note 11 supra.
100Wagner-Connery Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976)).
101See text accompanying note 38 supra.
102See

text accompanying note 23 supra.
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